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Abstract- The reliability of a system is defined as the probability of system functioning. 
In reliability theory one is studying how the reliability of a system can be assessed from 
the reliabilities of its components. In the first part of this paper we consider the safety of a 
nuclear power plant from a reliability theory point of view. Especially one is focussing on 
the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 and the incidents at Le Bugey in 1984 and in Barsebiick 
1992. Some main areas of modern reliability theory of interest for the safety of nuclear 
power plants are indicated. In the second part of the paper risk and risk aversion are 
considered by first showing how these concepts are applied in modern non-life insurance 
mathematics. At the end we discuss the link to the choice between different energy supplies. 
RELIABILITY 
The reliability of a system is defined as the probability of system functioning. In reliability 
theory one is studying how the reliability of a system can be assessed from the reliabilities 
of its components. At the 18th European Meeting of Statisticians in Berlin, GDR, on 22-
26 August 1988, the first author organized a session on "Reliability of large technological 
systems". This topic was obviously a hot one at the time, due to e.g. the Chernobyl 
catastrophe on 26 April1986. Some have claimed that this accident was totally unexpected; 
but this is to ignore the fact that even before the Three Mile Island accident on 28 March 
1979, the American Reactor Safety Study(ll had been strongly criticized(2- 3l. Laaksonen(4), 
of the Finnish Center for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, has expressed the following opinion 
on the Chernobyl accident: 
The Chernobyl accident provided a discouraging example of a phenomenon which would 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to foresee and take into account in a proba-
bilistic risk analysis. Also the events which are usually considered in the safety analyses 
have almost been standardized 15 years ago. 
The accident took place when the operators were decreasing the reactor power, prior 
to taking the plant out of service for scheduled maintenance. A special test of electrical 
systems was to be made at the stage the reactor had reached the power of 700 - 1000 
MW (20-30% of nominal power). At the beginning of the test the reactor was to be 
scrammed automatically and thus no interaction was expected between the reactor and 
the other plant systems. 
In the course of test preparation a coincidence of unfavourable operational steps 
brought the reactor to a state where it could reach prompt criticality in a few seconds. 
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The dangerous core characters were evoked by the operators who were lacking suffi-
cient knowledge in reactor physics. During the 12 hours preceding the explosion the 
operators committed deliberately at least six severe violations of operating rules. Four 
of these were such that without any of them the accident would have been avoided: 
1. Continued reactor operation without the necessary differential reactivity worth in 
the control rods (operation below the permissible value was indicated clearly on a 
computer printout). 
2. Continued reactor operation below the minimum allowable power level. 
3. Blocking of the reactor scram signals associated with steam drum level and reactor 
coolant pressure. 
4. Blocking of the reactor scram signals associated with trip of both turbogenerator 
units. 
The operator behaviour was of course unforgivable but I think it can be understood 
from the following viewpoints: 
a common attitude on operational rules in the Russian plants has been obviously 
quite relaxed: the rules have been taken as guidelines and not as strict orders 
the safety record of RBMK-reactors was good and no precursory events of this type 
had ever occurred 
Chernobyl unit 4 had an excellent reputation among the RBMK plants and the 
operators were evidently too selfconfident 
the operators were not able to raise the reactor power above 200 MW with the 
normal control systems (the power level followed changes in the coolant void content 
but the operators did not realize the situation clearly enough). 
What the Chernobyl accident really did was to call into question the existing risk and safety 
analyses of large technological systems. 
This was further underlined by the Piper Alpha oil-rig accident in the North Sea on 6 July 
1988, where 167 people were killed. This issue will now be discussed more closely. 
In applying reliability theory to such systems, the following problems arise: 
Lack of knowledge on the functioning of the system and its components; 
Lack of relevant data; 
Lack of knowledge on the reliability of the human components; 
Lack of knowledge on the quality of computer software; 
Lack of knowledge on dependencies between the components. 
This makes it almost impossible to assess the probability of failure of a large technological 
system. Hence, the use of risk analysis to back political decisions on controversial safety 
issues is dubious, to say the least. If, however, a political decision has already been made, 
risk analysis and reliability theory can contribute essentially to improving the safety of a 
system. This is just the case for Norwegian offshore activities and for the Swedish nuclear 
power industry. It should, however, be noted that the latter is in some trouble after the 
incident in the Barsebiick 2 reactor on 28 July 1992. The site is very close to Copenhagen 
and the Danish environmental movement OOA has, also on the basis of a report(5l from 
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the first author, claimed the plant to be permanently closed down. Since Denmark has 
decided not to have nuclear power plants, the risk imposed by the nearby Swedish nuclear 
reactors is especially questionable from an ethical point of view. 
The incident showed that the emergency core cooling system could fail rapidly, in case of 
a pipe rupture, due to a much faster than expected clogging of the strainer for emergency 
cooling water by washed down mineral wool insulation. The emergency core cooling system 
was modified and a socalled probabilistic safety analysis carried through during the autumn 
1992. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate determined on January 4 1993 to restart 
the Barseback 2 reactor. The critique ofthis probabilistic safety analysis by the first author 
seems to be of general interest: 
1. Just a very minor part of the documentation on the modified system was a proper 
probabilistic safety analysis and even this part was not very well founded. The rest 
was pure technical considerations. 
2. No probabilistic safety analysis was done for the complete safety system of the 
reactor. Therefore, there was no sufficient guarantee that the introduction of the 
modified emergency core cooling system had not led to a weakening of the remaining 
safety system. 
3. The sensitivity of wrong judgements in the safety analysis is tested by just vary-
ing one parameter at a time instead of a simultaneous sensitivity analysis of the 
parameters. 
Undoubtedly, the analysis contributed to improve the safety of the system. However, as 
presented, it seemed to promise more. Hence the critique also concerns the communication 
and the information on the contents of the analysis. Generally, openness and honesty are 
key points in all sorts of communication, and of utmost importance when dealing with 
radiation risks due to public sceptisism. 
To improve the safety of a system we need measures of the relative importance of each com-
ponent for system reliability. Barlow and Proschan (B) suggested that the most important 
component is that having the highest probability of finally causing system failure by its 
own failure. The first author has since developed a theory supporting another measure(7). 
The component whose failure contributes most to reducing the expected remaining lifetime 
of the system is the most important one. 
The Chernobyl accident provided new data on nuclear power plants. What type of theory 
do we have to benefit from such data in future risk analyses in the nuclear industry? The 
characteristic feature of this type of theory is that one benefits both from data for the 
system's components and for the system itself. Furthermore, due to lack of sufficient data 
one is completely dependent on benefiting from the experience and judgement of engineers 
concerning the technological components and on those of psychologists and sociologists for 
the human components. This leads to subjectivistic probabilities. 
The frequentistic interpretation of probability often makes little sense in dealing with risk 
analysis of rare events. However, both the subjectivistic and frequentistic probabilities are 
obeying the same natural rules of computation, based on the same axiomatic system, as 
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opposed to the corresponding concepts in fuzzy set theory. 
The methodology of statistical inference that can deal naturally with subjectivistic probab-
ilities(s) is called Bayesian after the English reverend and probabilist Thomas Bayes, who 
died in 1761. One starts out by using expert opinion and experience as to the reliability 
of the components. This information is then updated by using data on the component 
level from experiments and accidents. Based on the information on the component level, 
the corresponding uncertainty in system reliability is derived. This uncertainty is modified 
by using expert opinion and experience on the system level. Finally, this uncertainty is 
updated by using data on the system level from experiments and accidents. 
Theory in this area is under development at the University of Oslo(9-10). It should be 
noted that the use of expert opinions is actually implemented in the regulatory work for 
nuclear power plants in the US(ll). A general problem when using expert opinions is the 
selection of the experts. This problem is an important one needing further work. Asking 
experts technical questions on the component level(lO), where the consequences for the 
overall reliability assessment on the system level are less clear, seems very advantageous. 
Too much experts' influence directly on system level assessments could then be prevented. 
In the magazine Nature(12), there was an article on an incident coming close to a catas-
trophe, which occured in the night of 14 April 1984 in a French pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) at Le Bugey on the Rhone river, not far from Geneva. 
The event began with the failure of the rectifier supplying electricity to one of the two 
separate 48 V direct-current control circuits of the 900 MW reactor which was on full 
power at the time. Instantly, a battery pack switched in to maintain the 48 V supply 
and a warning light began to flash at the operators in the control room. Unfortunately, 
the operators ignored the light (if they had not, they could simply have switched in an 
auxiliary rectifier). 
What then happened was something which had been completely ignored in the engi-
neering risk analysis for the PWR. The emergency battery now operating the control 
system began to run down. Instead of failing precipitously to zero, as assumed in the 
"all or nothing" risk analysis, the voltage in the control circuit steadily slipped down 
from its nominal 48 V to 30 V over a period of three hours. In response a number of 
circuit breakers began to trip out in an unpredictable fashion until finally the system, 
with the reactor still at full power, disconnected itself from the grid. 
The reactor was now at full power with no external energy being drawn from the system 
to cool it. An automatic "scram" system then correctly threw in the control rods, 
which absorbed neutrons and shut off the nuclear reaction. However a reactor in this 
condition is still producing a great deal of heat - 300 MW in this case. An emergency 
system is then supposed to switch in a diesel generator to provide emergency core 
cooling (otherwise the primary coolant would boil and vent within a few hours). But 
the first generator failed to switch on because of the loss of the first control circuit. 
Luckily the only back-up generator in the system then did switch in, averting a serious 
accident. 
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The article in Nature furthermore stated: 
But the Le Bugey incident shows that a whole new class of possible events had been 
ignored- those where electrical systems fail gradually. It shows that risk analysis must 
not only take into account a yes or no, working or not working, for each item in the 
reactor, but the possibility of working with a slightly degraded system. 
In 1978 Barlow and Proschan initiated the development of a theory of reliability where 
both the components and the system are described in a more refined way than just as 
functioning or failing. During the 1980s, the University of Oslo has been central in the 
development of this theory(13l. It has also been indicated how this theory can be applied 
to offshore electrical power supply systems and pipeline networks. Furthermore, efficient 
algorithms and computer software based on this theory have been developed. 
RISK AND RISK AVERSION 
The risk notion is often used in an unprecise way not only in daily language, but also 
among socalled experts. The Norwegian Nuclear Power Commission Report(14l gives the 
following incorrect definition: 
"Risk is the probability of a certain undesirable consequence". 
This contributes to a very unclear discussion of risk aversion in their work. The usual 
mathematical definition is(15l: 
"Risk is the expected loss of utility". 
Hence risk is a weighted average of economical losses due to different consequences, with 
the corresponding probabilities as weights. The fruitfulness of this definition hopefully 
becomes evident from the following discussion of risk aversion. 
An important contribution to modern non-life insurance mathematics is the application of 
utility theory in the treatment of the client's and the insurance company's risk assessments. 
Typical examples of problems that can be studied inside this theory are: 
Why is the insurance company willing to accept the risk which the client wishes to 
get rid of? 
What prize (premium) is the client willing to pay for insurance of a certain risk? 
How is a less likely major loss assessed compared to a more likely minor loss? 
We consider a potential insurance client A, which will be referred to as a person, but might 
as well be a company, a society or another economical unit. A carries a risk that can cause 
him an economical loss in the coming year, such as a risk associated with fire and water 
damage or liability. 
We assume that it is possible to give a simple number for the personal loss of utility A 
feels by loosing x dollars. Call this loss of utility l ( x). It may at first glance be considered 
reasonable to assume that the loss function is the straight line l ( x) = x shown in figure 
1a. In this case A assesses a loss of 20 000 dollars to be twice as serious as a loss of 10 000 
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dollars. This may, however, not be true. It can be more reasonable to assume that the loss 
of the first 10 000 dollars is easier to accept than the additional last 10 000 dollars. If A 
in advance has lost a considerable part of his fortune, an additional loss of 10 000 dollars 
can cause serious personal consequences as executor's sale and loss of credit, leading to a 
significantly reduced standard of living and loss of social position and prestige. 
These points· of view indicate that the loss function should increase faster, the larger the 
loss is, as shown in figure lb. A marginal loss of 10 000 dollars is then assessed as more 
serious, the larger loss A has suffered in advance. 
l(x)=x 
l(x) 
0 0 X X 
Figure la. A straight loss function Figure lb. A convex loss function 
It can be shown that if A seeks insurance in spite of the fact that the premium is higher 
than the expected loss, then his assessment of loss is represented by the convex loss function 
of figure lb and not the straight loss function of figure la. He is risk aversive making him 
prefer a fixed premium compared to a rather unlikely major loss, although the premium is 
larger than the average loss associated with the risk. 
In insurance companies the premiums are considerably higher than the expected claims 
because the premiums, in addition to cover claims expenses, shall cover administration 
costs. Even so, people insure cars, houses and furniture and companies have fire, stock 
damage and product liability insurance. The clients' actual behaviour accordingly corre-
sponds to the assumption of a convex loss function and we can conclude that they are risk 
aversive. 
Now assume that A can choose between two risks RandS where R has the lowest damage 
probability whereas S has correspondingly smaller claims expenses if damage incurs, such 
that the expected annual claims expenses are identical for the two risks. It can then in 
a similar way be shown that A prefers the risk S compared to R. Due to risk aversion 
frequent, minor losses are preferred compared to rare major losses. 
There are obvious similarities between A's choice of risk R or S and the society's choice 
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of nuclear, hydroelectrical or fossil power. If we without restrictions transfer the results 
above to the choice of different energy supplies, they can be formulated as: 
Two energy supply alternatives giving the same expected annual loss do not have 
to be assessed as equally risky. An alternative giving more frequent incidents with 
moderate consequences is, under otherwise equal conditions, preferred compared 
to an alternative giving more rare incidents with catastrophic consequences. 
Especially, it follows that the risk associated with nuclear power is underestimated if 
one is only considering expected annual loss. The risk aversion is linked to the possible 
catastrophic nuclear power accidents. 
The probabilities of different types and degrees of damage associated with energy pro-
duction are not known exactly. The probability of construction site accidents may be 
satisfactorily estimated from statistical data, whereas the probability of serious accidents 
with a new nuclear reactor type must be estimated from reliability studies including limited 
data from other not completely similar reactors. The possibility of incorrectly estimating 
the damage probabilities enters as an extraordinary contribution to the risk, which from a 
risk aversion point of view disfavours the energy supply alternatives with the less certain 
estimated damage probabilities. 
Generally, we hope that the readers have the risk aversion point of view in mind when 
discussing different sorts of radiation risk. It is not irrational to be risk aversive when 
confronted with great uncertainties. 
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